Beyond the European Commission's initiatives
Translated from the French, which remains the reference text. This translation is under review.
Introduction: the many European initiatives
At this stage of the report, the dominant feeling is one of a profusion of European Commission initiatives in favour of the continent's digital sovereignty. If the Commission is mobilising, the Member States and civil society are not standing by, at the risk of introducing new complexities into the construction of a common project.
In this chapter, we review the main initiatives seeking to contribute to the project of a European digital sovereignty, going from the most institutional to the least institutional. The EDIC Digital Commons, first: a consortium of Member States, created by decision of the Commission and launched in December 2025, to give the digital commons a lasting institution. The Sovereign Tech Fund, next: a German federal scheme that has funded since 2022 the maintenance of the software building blocks on which everyone depends, and whose European version is the subject of advocacy. EuroCommons, third: a coalition of three hundred organisations, launched in July 2026 by the Caisse des Dépôts, the financial arm of the French State, to industrialise the migration towards the digital commons. Eurostack, finally: a strategy of industrial power carried since 2024 by academics, industrialists and civil society organisations, which offers itself as the framework of unification of the whole.
4.1EDIC Digital Commons
The EDIC is the institutional response to a complex point of friction in the construction of Europe: the implementation of a shared and lasting governance between Member States. Until then, carrying large infrastructure projects came up against unsuitable legal structures, often marked by excessive rigidity or by a dependence on private foundations.
The European Digital Infrastructure Consortium (EDIC) is an instrument created within the framework of the Digital Decade policy programme 2030 (EU decision 2022/2481 of 14 December 2022). This mechanism allows at least three Member States to pool their human, financial and technical resources to steer cross-border infrastructures, without renouncing their autonomy: each EDIC is a legal person established by decision of the Commission, with a legal personality recognised throughout the territory of the Union.
"Each EDIC is a legal person established by a Commission decision upon the application of at least three Member States and Commission approval."
— European Commission, DG CONNECT
The Digital Commons EDIC is its operational translation applied to digital commons. Carried initially by France, Germany, the Netherlands and Italy, with its statutory seat fixed in Paris, the consortium was officially launched in The Hague on 11 December 2025. It extends the Berlin Summit and the « Declaration for European Digital Sovereignty ». While Luxembourg and Slovenia appear as candidate members, Poland and Belgium take part as observers. Its field of action covers the cloud, office software, secure messaging and decentralised social networks, with a default rule: all software resulting from this joint development is published under a free licence.
This arrangement embodies the political will to guarantee the durability of the continent's strategic assets, by transforming research initiatives into lasting institutions. The roadmap is now set: by 2027, the consortium must deploy a one-stop shop, a centre of expertise, as well as a Forum and a Prize for digital commons. It will also deliver an annual reference report, the « State of the Digital Commons ». More than a mere technical manager, the EDIC positions itself as an incubator and a centralised point of entry for the European ecosystem.
"open, interoperable and reusable digital solutions that can be shared across borders, so called Digital Commons [...] an incubator and one stop shop."
— European Commission
4.2Sovereign Tech Fund
The Sovereign Tech Fund (STF) was initially a German federal scheme. Initiated in 2022 and supported by the Ministry for Economic Affairs (BMWK) through an annual appropriation of the Bundestag, it has been run since the end of 2024 by the Sovereign Tech Agency, an offshoot of the SPRIND agency dedicated to breakthrough innovation. Its relevance lies in the fact that it prefigures a paradigm shift that the European Union now aims to generalise: the abandonment of an exclusive logic of subsidy to innovation (seed funding) in favour of a strategy of lasting infrastructural maintenance.
Whereas the classic mechanisms fund the emergence of novelties, the STF values the « invisible work » indispensable to the robustness of the network: security audits, systematic remediation of flaws and technical documentation. This effort is structured around specific instruments such as the Bug Resilience Program, articulated with the main fund and a Fellowship programme. The funding doctrine is revealing: a minimum threshold of 50,000 euros, with no predefined upper limit, simply requiring that the code be released under a free licence certified by the OSI or the Free Software Foundation (FSF).
By taking on the role of insurer of the software supply chain, the STF deploys a policy of resilience. It concentrates its resources on the fundamental technological building blocks, often maintained by isolated contributors. The Log4j crisis remains the founding argument of this approach, illustrating how the failure of a volunteer software component can weaken the whole of the world's state and industrial infrastructures.
"the Log4j security flaw, which highlighted how a bug in a volunteer-maintained software library could destabilise governments and companies worldwide."
— European Commission, Open Source Observatory
The financial scale-up testifies to a clear acceleration: from 3.5 million euros per year at the launch in 2022, the budget reached 17 million euros in 2024, totalling more than 24 million euros invested in some sixty projects of global scope. A strong symbol of this commitment: the investment of 875,000 euros in the OpenJS Foundation in May 2023, representing unprecedented support for a project linked to the Linux Foundation. This method secures sovereignty from the base by preventing the withering of essential digital commons.
This German experience now serves as a direct reference for the advocacy of an EU Sovereign Tech Fund. Carried by OpenForum Europe, this project aims at a transposition on a continental scale, although it does not yet constitute, to date, an operational commitment of the European Commission.
4.3Eurocommons (CDC)
The entry onto the stage of the Caisse des Dépôts marks a strategic turning point: the appropriation of Digital Commons by the financial arm of the State. Launched on 1 July 2026, EuroCommons is not a mere financial tool, but an industrial coalition integrated into the Horizon Numérique 2030 plan, endowed with an overall envelope of 18 billion euros.
“€18 billion strategic plan, Horizon Numérique 2030 [...] July 1, 2026, in Paris, with the first TechSprint running from July 2026 to November 2027.”
The break is doctrinal. Far from logics of immediate profitability, the arrangement federates an ecosystem of 300 organisations (CIOs, Open Source vendors, foundations and public actors) structured into eleven thematic poles. Membership is free, the investment capacity being carried directly by the Caisse des Dépôts.
“brings together some 300 European organisations (CIOs, Open Source vendors, foundations and public institutions) [...] form eleven coalitions”
This arrangement rests on a classic modality of financial engineering: the cash advance. The consortium requests funds for the production of software resources, then repays the lending institution through the budgetary savings linked to the abandonment of proprietary software. This self-liquidating model certainly proves rigorous, but lacks a disruptive character. By relying solely on the arbitrage of licences, it supports a logic of replacement rather than of breakthrough innovation, thereby limiting the real growth of digital commons. The EuroCommons initiative must now propose more ambitious frameworks, able to federate public procurement and the large users around a structural support for free-software vendors, beyond mere repayment backed by avoided expenditure.
“EuroCommons will provide funding, in the form of cash advances: [...] they can obtain some funding for their project, the savings being used to repay the loan - a kind of 'business plan' towards sovereignty, with CDC acting as a bank.”
This arrangement imposes a strict neutrality of governance. The European foundation OW2, of which the Caisse des Dépôts is now a strategic member, hosts the assets and guarantees trust between contributors and sponsors. The effort bears first on Digital Workspaces and business applications, with first deliverables expected for September 2026.
“OW2 is also perceived as a hosting foundation for such initiatives, for example on verticals like digital workplaces or business applications [...] establish the necessary trust.”
The ambition is to organise the industrialisation of the migration towards Digital Commons, in a break with the extractive model of the hyperscalers. Through a TechSprint running until November 2027, EuroCommons raises free software to the rank of public infrastructural heritage, supported by public procurement and co-production.
At the launch on 1 July 2026, the tone was one of concrete action. Catherine Mayenobe (CDC) advocated a real migration rather than new charters, seeing in the European lag a purely organisational challenge. Aymeril Hoang described a movement « by CIOs for CIOs », anchored in operational needs. Laurent Rojey (EDIC) placed the stake on the scale of a continental open source strategy backed by the Fonds de Compétitivité, the only way to break dependencies within 24 months. David Djaïz (Ascend) recalled the urgency of resilience in the face of the 265 billion euros of exposed annual spending, citing the explosion of prices after the takeover of VMware. Finally, Henri Verdier (Inria) insisted that the stability of a commons rests on its governance and on its capacity to federate contributors.
This milestone joins the conclusions of our investigation: the India Stack was cited on several occasions as the reference model for building digital public infrastructures based on open protocols.
4.4Eurostack
Eurostack does not define itself as one more software product, but as a strategy of industrial power worked out between 2024 and 2025. This proposal aims at the construction of a continental, sovereign and exhaustive technology stack, encompassing the whole of the value chain: from semiconductors to data centres, from the cloud to connectivity, and from software to AI systems. This project is organised around two complementary pillars.
On the one hand, an industrial dynamic launched at the European Parliament in September 2024 under the aegis of Cristina Caffarra, Francesca Bria and Meredith Whittaker. This coalition formalised its intention in a framing document (January 2025) and then through an open letter (March 2025) supported by more than eighty organisations. In the wake of the Draghi Report, this framework structures the "stack" into three fundamental strata: the physical infrastructure, the logical infrastructure and the intermediation layer.
“1. Hard/Physical Infrastructure [...] 2. Soft/Logical Infrastructure [...] 3. Intermediation”
“EuroStack does encompass initiatives like the European digital identity wallet (EUDIW) [...] the proposed Digital Euro [...] and data spaces, but goes beyond.”
— EuroStack, A Pitch Document, 10/01/2025
The second pillar, academic and forward-looking in nature, is embodied in the report EuroStack, A European Alternative for Digital Sovereignty (February 2025). Produced for the Bertelsmann Stiftung by Francesca Bria, Paul Timmers and Fausto Gernone, in connection with CEPS and UCL IIPP, this work recommends the adoption of a « Buy European Act ». The study puts the necessary effort at 300 billion euros by 2035, including a seed fund of 10 billion, and rests on an alarming finding of dependency:
“More than 80% of Europe's digital technologies and infrastructures are imported, and 70% of the foundational AI models used globally originate in the United States.”
— Bertelsmann Stiftung
The shared doctrine is crystal clear: the regulatory arsenal (DMA, DSA, GDPR) has reached its structural limits for lack of concrete alternatives. Europe must now steer its own digital industry as a priority of industrial policy. Eurostack constitutes the framework of unification needed to transform a multitude of fragmented initiatives into a sovereign ecosystem capable of breaking the hegemony of the hyperscalers.
4.5Conclusion
The issues are identified, the vision is set, the means are committed and the laws enacted, but Europe does not manage to move from vision to industrialisation. Among many possible causes, we choose to keep one: Europe advances in dispersed order. From it we draw its corollary: its challenge is now that of integration.
The dispersed order can be read on three levels. NGI has funded a "primordial soup" of technological building blocks, few of which communicate with one another. The Data Spaces develop as islands, and each new connection is paid for with an integration tax: fragmentation, writes the Digital New Deal, is a tax on participation. Public policies, finally, multiply: NGI, the Open Internet Stack, the EDIC, the Sovereign Tech Fund, EuroCommons, Eurostack, and this very vitality threatens to make them compete rather than complement one another.
The challenge of integration arises on the same three levels, with a complexity proper to the European vision: it is not a matter of integrating a set of digital solutions vertically, under a single platform and a single authority, but of integrating them horizontally, through common protocols of interoperability and inter-cooperation capable of bringing them into synergy, into a system.
Between the NGI projects, this is the object of the Open Internet Stack, which aims to move from a sum of isolated building blocks to an integrated stack.
Between NGI and the Data Spaces, which advance in parallel while they have much to bring each other: NGI holds software building blocks and technical solutions that the Data Spaces ecosystem needs; the Data Spaces hold what NGI did not have, the experience of data-sharing ecosystems, of techno-legal infrastructures and of the difficulties of interoperability between trades and sectors, and with it many use cases, user communities and funders.
Between public policies, finally: articulating them within States, between States and at the European level, between public actors and civil society, so that they enter into synergy rather than competition.
Building union from fragmentation: the title of the Digital New Deal report states the programme. Another trajectory, at the same moment, proceeded in the reverse order.