FondationFAM Numérique 5ème cycleNumérique 5ème cycle
DonateDons
IntroductionIntroduction General introduction Introduction générale

Introduction: towards a multilateral, cosmo-local and techno-legal third way

Translated from the French, which remains the reference text. This translation is under review.

Thinking the future of digital infrastructures on a world scale demands today that we extract ourselves from a problematic geopolitical binary. For two decades, the story of Internet governance has seemed condemned to oscillate between two hegemonies. On one side, American « platform colonialism », imposing a deregulated market model that ends in the privatisation of critical infrastructures, in the proprietary lock-in (vendor lock-in) of their users and in the massive monetisation of their data. On the other, the Chinese state model, where technological hyper-centralisation becomes the instrument of dirigisme and mass surveillance.

It is precisely in the search for an alternative model to this duopoly that the Indian and European strategies are being forged today.

On the European side, this structural refusal is the political ground of the Commission's innovation policies: the Next Generation Internet (NGI) programme, for instance, was conceived as early as 2016 to rebuild an open and « human-centric » web, while the deployment of the Data Spaces, resting on an ambitious legislation (Data Act, Data Governance Act, DMA, DSA) and on substantial funding, explicitly aims to break the silos of the hyperscalers in order to restore sovereignty to economic actors.

On the Indian side, the determination to solve the country's structural problems, combined with that of not becoming a mere « digital colony » of the 2 superpowers, motivated the spectacular development of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI), which is now being exported, massively, to the global South.

Beyond their differences, numerous yet superficial, this report shows that the Indian and European trajectories converge to formulate a systemic « third model », conceptualised by Henri Verdier (former French Ambassador for Digital Affairs) under the term « open digital strategic autonomy ». It consists in mastering the critical layers of technology in order to cooperate sovereignly on a world scale, without retreating behind protectionist fortresses.

In this new paradigm, the figure of public power is transformed. Both blocs promote, in outline, the vision of a « Partner State » (Partner State), a concept proposed by the P2P theorist Michel Bauwens. The state no longer has the vocation of governing the final applications (moving away from the command model), nor of effacing itself before private monopolies (moving away from laissez-faire): its historical role is redefined, it becomes the guarantor, the regulator and the facilitator of the infrastructure commons. It fosters the creation and maintenance of an infrastructural base made of protocols and standards, on which civil society is invited to build interoperable and decentralised digital ecosystems.

This convergence can be read in three shared traits, which the third part of the report will take up one by one.

The first concerns architecture. The India Stack ecosystem theorised the principle « Public rails, private innovation »; the European doctrine for scaling up the Data Spaces answers it word for word: « cooperate on rails, compete on services ». On both sides, the interoperability layer is conceived as the bottleneck of the digital economy, which must not be privatised; it is by pooling and standardising the "plumbing" that makes up our digital infrastructures, through common protocols, that public authority lowers the barriers to entry and restores to the application layer the possibility of abundant competition and innovation (pattern no. 4, « Minimising the surface of the common »).

The second concerns law. The two geopolitical powers have understood that declarative regulation is ineffective against the velocity and the complexity of the digital economy, and they write the rule into the code itself: through the executable Rulebooks of the Data Spaces in Europe, through the cryptographic consent of the DEPA architecture in India (pattern no. 6, « Coding the law »).

The third concerns institutions. Refusing hyper-statisation as much as privatisation, the two blocs entrust the operation of their infrastructure commons to neutral, not-for-profit structures: Section 8 companies and self-regulatory organisations in India, data intermediaries and foundations in Europe (pattern no. 9, « The guardian who does not own »).

Schema I.1 · From parallel trenches to an open fabric

Parallel trenches An open fabric demand Platform A supply demand Platform B supply demand Platform C supply each platform owns both of its banks one cooperates : common rails, open protocol demand app 1 service 1 supply demand app 2 service 2 supply demand app 3 service 3 supply in competition in competition entering through app 1, the demand reaches service 3
What changes from one side to the other is a single edge : the common rail, which lets a demand entering through one app reach a supply served by another. In the model Pramod Varma presents, the platform no longer owns both banks ; it becomes one service among others.After Pramod Varma, Inria, 16 September 2026, slides 36 and 37 (© NFH 2026).See also : Schema 6.3, The digital energy grid · Schema 7.1, Openness comes from underneath.

This report was born of the Fondation FAM's determination to weigh on the orientations of the French and European digital strategy, in a context marked by two factors liable to combine and precipitate the shift towards a new digital cycle:

  • a crisis of the model of power that dominates today's digital world, with the probable arrival of a great earthquake: not only a stock-market crash, but the global collapse of a business model founded on the centralised architecture of the Web;
  • the deployment of generative AI, which had been conceived as a means of legitimising the centralised power of today's Goliaths but which could nevertheless hasten their fall, if it is confirmed that it in fact favours open source and the decentralisation of powers (see Philippe Lemoine's editorial).

In May 2025, its Steering Committee therefore chose to reopen in its programme a strand devoted to the stakes of digital technology, with the ambition of informing the European strategy on the technological building blocks and the deployment strategies capable of supporting an emancipatory conception of digital technology. To that end it examines two fields: the research and innovation policies of the European Commission, for themselves, and the Indian trajectory, for the transposable lessons it offers Europe.

The mission is borne by the Fondation FAM; the report is signed by Sacha Roger and Guillaume Rouyer. The investigation rested on six strands of questions set by the commissioning body, on the building and use of a bibliography combining academic and grey literature, on nine in-depth interviews, most of them conducted remotely, with actors of the two ecosystems, and on the constitution of a collaborative and decentralised knowledge base that links every statement of the report to its sources. The report is published as open source; it is addressed principally to the architects of European digital infrastructures and to policy-makers.

It is also meant to feed the debate on the prospect of a common digital third way, between Europeans and the actors of Digital Public Infrastructure (DPI) in India and in the global South. As noted above, the investigation made it possible to objectify the convergence of visions, architectures and intentions. The report accordingly presents a comparative analysis of the strategies and developments on the different continents, in order to identify their common challenges and prospects of synergy. The plan reflects this stake.

The first part examines the European digital strategies. It draws, on the one hand, on European regulation and regulatory innovation, whose broad lines it recalls; it examines, on the other hand, certain research and innovation instruments, in the order in which they appeared: the Next Generation Internet programme, its origin, its working and its results (chapter 1); the Data Spaces, from their genesis in the Fraunhofer laboratories to their results and their future (chapter 2); the Open Internet Stack that succeeds NGI (chapter 3); and the many initiatives that follow in their wake, from the EDIC Digital Commons to the Eurostack coalition (chapter 4).

The second part examines the digital strategies of India and the Global South: the India Stack, its history, its philosophy and its architectural choices (chapter 5); then its futures, from MOSIP to Networks for Humanity (chapter 6).

The third part turns to a multilateral third way. The chapter on common stakes (chapter 7) proposes to embrace the complexity of the two trajectories: it identifies eleven tensions that run through them, draws out one invariant and five operators, and names the seven challenges met or taken up by the European and Indian strategies in their efforts to build a third way. The last chapter, finally (chapter 8), proposes a pattern language capable of informing, on the strategic, practical, financial and technical planes, the prospect of a digital third way that is at once multilateral, cosmo-local and techno-legal.

The conclusion opens onto the strategic horizon of the convergence.

Mission carried by the Fondation FAM. Mission portée par la Fondation FAM. ← Back to mission homeRetour à l'accueil de la mission www.fondation-fam.org — Introduction: towards a multilateral, cosmo-local and techno-legal third way — published 2026-10-06 · updated 2026-10-28 www.fondation-fam.org — Introduction : Vers une troisième voie multilatérale, cosmo-locale et techno-légale — publié le 6 octobre 2026 · mis à jour le 28 octobre 2026